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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and
fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We
consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlap-
ping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in
an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational
connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result
is that when dividends depend on proﬁts, book value ex ante dominates
fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in con-
trast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better
allocation as it reﬂects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regu-
lation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks
to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves
intratemporal eﬃciency.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
We like to feel that, not only do the ﬁgures in the balance sheet
show you the true position, but that the real position is a little better
still.
W. E. Hubbard, Chairman, London and County Bank1.
The aim of this paper is to explore the eﬀect of ﬁnancial institutions ac-
counting rules, i.e. book or fair value, on the allocation of resources so as to
identify its social costs and beneﬁts.
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1In the speech of W. E. Hubbard to shareholders at the annual meeting, 7 February 1901.
1During the last two decades the issue whether bank assets and liabilities
should be accounted for at their historical (book) value or at market (fair) value
has been the object of an intense debate among regulators. In the end, fair
value accounting, supported by the Joint Working Group of Standard Setters2,
seems to have the upper hand. Although these points can be disputed on the
basis of asymmetric information and managerial incentives to truthfully reveal
information, the prevailing view is that a suﬃciently high level of penalties could
restore incentives for managers to report the true market values of assets and
liabilities.
The case in favour of fair value accounting has been based on the idea that
fair value could increase market discipline and lead managers to take the right
value maximizing decisions. Yet, it has been argued that fair value account-
ing increases the volatility of banks proﬁts, and this will hurt the business of
banking, which is based on the long term relationship of a bank with its clients
(Chisnall, 2000). Additionally, it has been argued that fair value accounting
lacks accuracy as it relies on subjective proxies for the market value of non-
tradeable ﬁnancial products (as loans). On the other hand, value accounting
may help preventing systemic crises, as information on banks ﬁnancial distress
is obtained earlier3.
This paper takes a completely diﬀerent view of the book vs. fair value
accounting debate.
Our objective is not to counter this arguments but to point out that there
is at least another important dimension at work, the degree of intertemporal
smoothing, and that it may support the use of book value accounting. From
that perspective, the main achievement of our paper is to show the dark side of
the comparison and to point out that the use of fair value accounting does not
dominate book value accounting in a straightforward and robust way. Moreover,
if we allow for fair value disclosure, the whole argument in favour of fair value
accounting seems to vanish4. Indeed, the market discipline argument is based
on disclosure of the fair value of assets and liabilities, not on its eﬀective use in
accounting with its ﬁscal and legal implications.
The argument developed in the present paper is that bank’s economic role is
to allow for intertemporal smoothing. By facilitating intergenerational transfer
of resources and insuring future generations consumption against risky asset
returns and price ﬂuctuations, banks improve expected welfare.
T h es t u d yo ft h ee ﬀect of accounting rules on the allocation of resources re-
quires a model where banking activity matters, that is, banks are not redundant
and their strategies have non-neutral eﬀects.
2The Working Group comprises representaives of the accounting standard setting bodies
represented on the G4+1, i.e. the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, plus Germany, France, the Nordic Federation and Japan.
3See, Enria et al. 2004 for a more complete summary of the diﬀerent arguments.
4Jackson and Lodge(2000) suggest this and point out that even if fair value accounting
is adopted, in most countries regulatory capital includes proﬁts only in as far as they are
realized. This means that the use of fair value accounting does allow to abandon book value
accounting, as the amount of unrealized proﬁts, that corresponds to the diﬀerence between
book and fair value proﬁts will still have to be reported.
2In a standard static model, such as the Arrow-Debreu model, where in-
stitutions do not play a signiﬁcant role, the issue of comparing diﬀerent ac-
counting rules cannot be addressed. More generally, in any situation where
the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, the value of a ﬁrm with book value and
fair value accounting should be the same. So, if we want to avoid this type of
shortcoming, it is worth starting by identifying the type of environments where
market imperfections make the book vs. fair value accounting rule relevant and
then proceed to compare their relative performance.
As a consequence, we are naturally led to develop a dynamic model of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation with active ﬁnancial intermediaries whose decisions depend
on the speciﬁc accounting rules adopted.
Following Allen and Gale(1997), we deﬁne a bank as an institution with the
ability to smooth intertemporal shocks. This is precisely the role mutual funds
cannot play. This is also related to the concept of banks as an additional security,
d e v e l o p e di nad i ﬀerent context by Diamond and Dybvig(1983), Jacklin(1987)
and Gorton and Pennacchi(1990). Yet, in some environments, the Modigliani-
Miller theorem holds and banks are redundant, and this prevents them from
performing any intertemporal smoothing. In this case, banking regulation will
become crucial in establishing banks as a diﬀerentiated security and ensuring
the superiority of the banking system. Because of the support of regulatory in-
stitutions (access to Central Bank/Deposit Insurance Company), banks are then
able to oﬀer contracts with superior intertemporal insurance characteristics.
Our main result establishes that if asset prices follow a martingale, as it
happens in an informationally eﬃcient market, then book value accounting is
preferred to fair value accounting. The main intuition for our result is related
to the role of banks in the intertemporal smoothing process. Banks will provide
insurance against unforeseen contingencies through their dividend policy. By
building reserves during good times and depleting them during bad times, banks
will be able to smooth consumption as did Pharaoh under Joseph’s guidance
avoiding the worst eﬀect of the seven year drought. Yet, competition among
banks may erode this role by making them focus on the current bank-owners
interests, thus disregarding future generations. In this case, regulation may
limit the banks shortsightedness by restricting the class of dividend rules that
banks may utilize. Since asset prices are assumed to follow a martingale, fair
value accounting rules lead to greater variability in proﬁts, and therefore in
dividend distribution; this in turn implies that book value accounting oﬀers
better intertemporal smoothing as dividend distribution is less variable.
It is diﬃcult to assert which, of market discipline and intertemporal smooth-
ing, is the dominant force, and, of course, clearly beyond the scope of our paper.
Our contribution is simply to emphasize intertemporal smoothing and why it
matters in the choice of an accounting system.
In a world with heterogenous competitive banks, accounting rules may have
diﬀerent eﬀects on how information is disseminated and used by investors in
their decisions, and this may have an impact on the resulting allocation.
The current debate of book vs. fair value accounting is reminiscent of the
debate on hidden reserves held by banks in the 60’s in the U.K,.where banks were
3exemplt from full disclosure of proﬁts. Indeed, the Company Law Committee
under Lord Jenkins assessed this exemption and recommended its continuation
in 1962. The basic argument for this recommendation was that this exemption
permitted the banking sector to absorb adverse shocks more eﬀectively and
thereby preserve its stability. It was suggested that full disclosure would not
necessarily mitigate the impact of shocks but instead could generate contagious
eﬀects to the rest of the banking sector in international ﬁnancial centres such as
London. On the other hand, banks in U.S.A. were obliged to publish operating
accounts during that period on the grounds that fragility could be corrected
more easily if it became common knowledge to all investors. More recently,
hidden reserves maintained by German banks have allowed them to deal more
eﬀectively with negative shocks to their balance sheets.
In sum, hidden reserves in the past and book vs. fair value accounting today
underscore similar insights and address quite related issues in banking.
The structure of our paper is the following: in Section 2 we present a stan-
dard (overlapping generation model, OLG) model with banks as intergenera-
tional connectors and equilibrium is calculated for the corresponding market
economy. We establish that the regulated banking mechanism ex ante domi-
nates the market economy allocation. We proceed in Section 3 to deﬁne a class
of dividend rules and how they are modiﬁed by the two diﬀerent accounting
schemes we consider, thus providing our main result. Section 4 addresses the
issue of fair value accounting as related to transparency and disclosure with its
beneﬁcial impact on intertemporal eﬃciency. Section 5 concludes and considers
potential extensions of the model.
2 Banks as intergenerational connectors
We consider a standard two-period OLG model without production. Time is
divided into a countably inﬁnite number of dates, t =0 ,1,.... A new generation
is born at each date t and lives for two periods. It consists of identical consumers
and at time t =0there is an initial old generation that lives for only one period
has no endowment but owns all the assets in the economy. There is a single
consumption good and the initial endowment of each generation et is received
when it is young5. This precludes borrowing.
There exists two technologies, one storage and one risky.
The storage technology is riskless and yields a zero return.
The risky asset is in limited supply and yields a stochastic return e yt, E(e yt) >
0, which is i.i.d. W ea s s u m et h a te yt ≥ 0. Because this return is higher than
zero, the risky asset will dominate the storage technology, provided price ﬂuc-
tuations are bounded, which we will initially assume. Furthermore, the risky
asset is perfectly durable. The riskless and risky assets are used to provide for
consumption in future dates and cannot be sold short.
5Formally, the endowment vector is denoted (e1t,e 2t),∀t. Since, the old generation does
not receive any endowment we suppress the generation index.
4We will also introduce a ﬁnancial intermediary which may be a mutual fund
or a bank whose role is that of an intergenerational connector between genera-
tions. This ﬁnancial intermediary may be implemented by the ﬁrst generation,
that is, the old generation at time t =0 . If so, every young generation will invest
in the bank’s equity the amount st and this will be transferred to the next gener-
ation. The bank buys a portfolio of the riskless and risky assets (technologies),
and issues deposit contracts at an interest rate rd. Also, the bank distributes
dividends according to some pre-speciﬁed rule Dt at each date t ∈ T.T h e s e
dividends are contingent as they depend upon the “state of nature” and in par-
ticular on the bank proﬁts which are computed either using a book value or a
fair value accounting rule.
In order to deﬁne a well speciﬁed framework, we introduce the following
notations:
cit= consumption at period i =1 ,2 of the generation born at t,
xt= amount of risky assets purchased,
st = amount of bank equity purchased by the young generation (sold by the
old generation)
dt = deposits at time t,
pt= risky asset price at t, and
qt= bank’s equity prices at t.
We assume that the time-separable utilities u(),v() are monotonic, strictly
concave and satisfy the Inada conditions. In what follows we will take u() =
v() = log(). This will allow us to simplify the dynamic structure of prices and
ﬁnd simple solutions to the dynamic recursive equations.
We normalize commodity prices to 1.
maxE {u(c1t)+v(c2t)}
c1t + ptxt + dt + stqt ≤ et
c2t ≤ (pt+1 + yt)xt + dt(1 + rd)+st (qt+1 + Dt)
Because in equilibrium both constraints are binding, we are allowed to sub-
stitute the values of the consumption, (c1t,c 2t). The problem is then to choose
the amount of assets (xt,d t,s t) that solves
maxu(et − (ptxt + dt + stqt)) + E {v((pt+1 + yt)xt + dt(1 + rd)+st (qt+1 + Dt))}
(1)
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
−u0(c1t)pt + E [v0(c2t)(pt+1 + yt)] = 0
−u0(c1t)+( 1+rd)E [v0(c2t)] = 0
−u0(c1t)qt + E [v0(c2t)(qt+1 + Dt)] = 0
5These conditions can be reinterpret e di nt e r m so fr i s ka n dr e t u r n . I fw e
denote the net rate of return on the risky asset and on the bank’s stock by rx







This allows us to establish that, as expected, because of the positive covari-
ance between c2t and rs, the concavity of v implies that there is a positive risk
premium, that depends upon the covariance of the marginal utility of consump-
tion with the return of the asset.
We will now proceed to compare the allocation resulting from a market
economy and the one generated by a banking economy.
2.1 Equilibrium in a market economy
To begin with, consider a market economy. Markets are incomplete for two
reasons: on the one hand, short sales are not allowed and on the other hand
each generation is only able to contract with the succeeding one.
At each period the old generation owns the risky asset and will sell it to the
next one when they are young.
An equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices, portfolios and consumption
bundles such that agents optimize their consumption and saving subject to their
budget constraints and markets clear.
Formally, an equilibrium will be described as a sequence (pt,q t,st,c1t,c 2t,d t,r d)
such that:
1. c1t,c 2t,x t,s t is optimally chosen by consumers, so that it solves (1)
2. c1t + c2t−1 = et + yt t =1 ,2,...
3. xt =1
4. st =1
Condition 2, 3 and 4 are market clearing conditions respectively for the
consumption good, the risky asset and the bank equity, where the supply of the
risky asset and of the bank equity is ﬁxed and normalized to one.
Furthermore, an equilibrium is a stationary Markov equilibrium only if
{(pt,q t);(c1t,c 2t,d t,xt)} = f(e yt),∀t ∈ T.
In other words, in a stationary Markov equilibrium the equilibrium variables
are related to the stochastic process (e yt)t∈T in a time-invariant way.
Expression (1) is then simpliﬁed as
maxu(et − ptxt)+E {v((pt+1 + yt+1)xt)} (2)
6In equilibrium, the ﬁrst order conditions will be satisﬁed for xt =1 , as the
representative consumer demands the whole available supply of the risky asset.
u0(et − pt)pt = E {v0(pt+1 + yt+1)(pt+1 + yt+1)} (3)
This yields the price pt as a function of the distribution of future prices pt+1.
For the logarithmic utilities case, the right hand side in (3) equals one and




yielding pt = et
2 .
T h ef a c tt h a tt h er i s k ya s s e td o m i n a t e st h es t o r a g eo n ei m p l i e st h a tt h e









T h u s ,i nam a r k e t ,t h eo l dg e n e r a t i o nh a sah i g h e re x p e c t e dc o n s u m p t i o n
and bears all the market risk embodied in the yt+1random variable.
In addition, as it is obvious from the above expressions, in a market econ-
omy, consumption depends exclusively on endowments and on contemporaneous
asset yields. There are no reserves to provide any smoothing and the expected
consumption is unbalanced, as it is larger in the second period. This ineﬃciency
is caused by the short-selling restriction and the fact that each generation con-
tracts only with the succeeding one.
2.2 Banking economy
When a bank exists, it holds the risky asset which is not traded among con-
sumers. The bank will therefore be a portfolio of cash Mt a n do fs t o c k sxB
t
with deposits dt remunerated at rate rd and a dividend distribution rule Dt.
The bank is initially owned by the ﬁrst generation, i.e. the old at t =0 .
Without loss of generality we will set deposits at the level dt =0 , for every
t and assume that the dividend is the total remuneration on the portfolio of
deposits and bank equity shares the consumer holds.
Expression 1 simpliﬁes to
maxu(et − stqt)+E {v(st (qt+1 + Dt))} (4)
The ﬁrst order conditions are then
u0(et − qt)qt = E {v0(qt+1 + Dt)(qt+1 + Dt)} (5)












Notice that as before the old generation has a higher expected consump-
tion. Nevertheless the dividend rule allows to smooth (or to exacerbate) the
distribution of the risky security return e yt+1.
As a consequence, the creation of a bank aﬀects the future generations con-
sumption.
Three remarks are in order to clarify the role of banks and their impact on
allocation.
First, notice that we have obtained this result assuming that consumers
cannot invest directly in the risky asset. If we assume consumers are able to
invest in both the asset and the bank shares, then arbitrage between the two
assets will allow the Modigliani-Miller theorem to hold and the bank dividend
policy will be irrelevant.
The following Lemma establishes that this will occur for a ﬁnite horizon T.
Therefore, if we take the limit as T goes to inﬁnity we will obtain a solution
where Modigliani-Miller theorem will hold.
Lemma 1 :I naﬁnite horizon, if consumers have access to both the risky asset
and the bank shares, the value of a bank is independent of its dividend policy.
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix.
This result establishes that when consumers have the same investment pos-
sibilities as the bank, any attempt to provide intertemporal smoothing through
the dividend policy will have an immediate eﬀect on the price of the bank asset
and this will make it ineﬀective. In this context, there is no diﬀerence between
a bank and a mutual fund, and the bank is redundant.
This result is not entirely surprising as the same eﬀect occurs in Diamond
and Dybvig: once agents have access to a market at an interim period the
provision of liquidity insurance by the bank is no longer possible. In both cases
are able to play the market against the bank contract, and this destroys any
insurance.
Notice that banking regulation could nevertheless provide intertemporal
smoothing, thus allowing the bank to design assets that a consumer cannot ac-
cess. So, for instance by providing deposit insurance, a regulated banking econ-
omy could provide some degree of intertemporal smoothing. However, credit
enhancement can only be provided to the economy by an outside institution.
8This is the case since the young generation has a higher endowment than the
old one.
A second remark concerns the processes of banks creation. Because the
degree of intertemporal smoothing depends on the reserves the banks have built,
it is clear that the ﬁrst generations will not beneﬁt from intertemporal insurance.
Consequently, the ﬁrst generation will never voluntarily set up a bank, except
if the price of the bank is higher than the value of the bank portfolio (as future
generations value the dividend smoothing services). In the logarithmic case
this is not true and therefore the banking system will be created either with
a subsidy to the ﬁrst generation or by coercing it to accept the bank. In any
case, our model points that the creation of an intertemporal smoothing banking
system goes hand in hand with the introduction of regulation.
A third remark concerns competition and the banks objective function. If
the banking system consist of several competing banks, they will compete each
period for new costumers. As a consequence, they will design their dividend
policy in order to attract the next generation. Since competition will start with
the ﬁrst generation, competing banks will promise the highest possible return,
and commit to pay a dividend equal to xB
t yt. Consequently, the bank will never
accumulate resources and this leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 : In a competitive banking system the banks’ dividend policy is to
pay the full amount of its proﬁt, xB
t yt, thus providing the same allocation as the
market economy.
Proof. To see why, consider in the logarithmic case two banks with equal
market shares and equal dividend rules. The equilibrium stock prices qt =
et
2 would be for both banks. If banks were oﬀering a dividend lower than xB
t yt,
a deviating bank oﬀering a higher dividend would provide a higher level of
consumption at period t =2 , thus attracting all demand.
2.3 Comparison
The next natural step is to examine the eﬃciency properties of equilibrium. For
t h i sp u r p o s e ,w ea d o p tt h ep o i n to fv i e wo ft h ee xa n t ed e s i g no ft h ea l l o c a t i o n
mechanism. This means that customers do not know initially in which gen-
eration they will live and therefore the objective is to maximize the expected
average utility. As it is well known, an ex ante eﬃciency allocation need not be
ex post eﬃcient. In the present framework, since any intertemporally smooth
dividend rule involves “taxing” the ﬁrst generations where the good state of na-
ture is realized, the bank economy is not ex post Pareto eﬃcient. This concept
of welfare analysis is in contrast with the classical ex post Pareto optimality
result derived in Samuelson(1957) .
One might expect, since the safe asset market is inactive, that markets are
complete and therefore equilibrium is eﬃcient. However, as the unborn agents
cannot invest (i.e. restricted participation) or alternatively because each gen-
eration lives for only two periods and thus longer investments are not possible,
market incompleteness is maintained.
9Banks are able to build stores of reserves and deplete them. The way in
which they do so depends on their dividend policy. We will postulate that their
policy is to provide intertemporal smoothing. This is done by distributing a
low dividend in good times and a high one in bad times. Notice that this is
precisely the opposite of the policy required to preserve capital. The preser-
vation of capital would imply the distribution of a low dividend in bad times
and the distribution of a high dividend in good times. The diﬀerence between
the two types of dividend rules comes from a diﬀerence in the objectives, as
capital regulation is aimed at limiting banks bankruptcies while our approach,
maximizes the ex ante representative consumer overall welfare. Put diﬀerently,
we note the existence of a trade oﬀ between ﬁnancial stability and eﬃciency.
To be more precise we state the following deﬁnition
Deﬁnition 1: As e r i e swt is intertemporally smoothing with respect to zt
over a horizon T if for every event ω ∈ Ω,z t is a mean preserving spread of




τ=0 wτ with equality for t = T.
Deﬁnition 2: As e r i e swt is intertemporally smoothing with respect to zt if
for every T,T ≥ T0,the series w0
t is intertemporally smoothing with respect to zt
over a horizon T, where w0







t is the amount invested in the storage economy.
Notice that the ﬁrst T0 periods are irrelevant for this deﬁnition.
Lemma 3 :I f wt is a mean preserving spread of zt over a horizon T then Pτ=T
τ=0 v(zt) ≥
Pτ=T
τ=0 v(wt) for any concave function v().
Proof. We apply the Rothschild-Stiglitz result not to the original proba-
bility distribution but simply to the resulting random drawing. For any given
event ω ∈ Ω, we are applying the Rothschild-Stiglitz theorem to the resulting
distribution over a horizon T with equal probabilities 1
T . This implies that for






v(wt). Since this is true for
every T, in the limit the inequality is preserved.
Application of the lemma to the consumption series for c2t in a market and
a banking economy leads to the following result.
Proposition 1: The bank economy allocation is ex ante Pareto superior to





2t) be the corresponding consumption plans
of the market and the banking economy respectively. cM
1t = cB
1t and Dt is in-













The upshot of the argument is that a mutual fund ﬁnancial intermediary
does not suﬃce to implement a pareto improving equilibrium. The reason is
that for intertemporal smoothing to occur a more complex type of contingent
contract, and therefore a more sophisticated banking structure is needed.
10As it is well known, OLG models produce ineﬃcient outcomes. Bloise and
Polemarchakis(2004) argue that this ineﬃciency can be removed as long as there
exists an “outside agent” of ﬁnite measure that facilitates transfers or resources
across generations. In our case, the role of this “outside agent” is played by the
banking system. Put diﬀerently, since markets are incomplete, the introduction
of a banking system increases the future contingencies for which insurance con-
tracts are available (i.e. the span of the traded assets increase). However, the
introduction of the new assets needs to be carefully chosen since any new asset
does not necessarily improve the equilibrium outcome.
2.4 Safety net and intertemporal smoothing
Proposition 1 shows how an inﬁnitely lived bank can provide intertemporal
smoothing through the dividends it pays. Still, the degree of smoothing will
depend on whether there are other mechanisms to provide additional insurance.
These mechanisms are part of the safety net of the banking system, and basically
provide the bank with an external insurance mechanism in order to design a se-
curity the market cannot create that involves a higher degree of intertemporal
smoothing. Whether this is obtained through bail-outs, subsidies, nationaliza-
tion or deposit insurance is irrelevant in the present context. In any case, the
creation of a safety net increases the degree of intertemporal smoothing and
improves the resulting allocation.
To illustrate our point, we will consider the two extreme cases regarding the
safety net. In the ﬁrst one, the bank is insured against all possible risks. In the
second one, the regulator provides no insurance whatsoever.
1. If the safety net allows to insure against any risk, the bank will be fully
insured and ﬁrst best ex ante optimality will be achieved. The bank need
not have any capital and will pay their depositors a rate equal to E(yt).
All generations will then be fully insured against the random return yt.
When the bank’s reserves are depleted, the Government or the Deposit
Insurance Company will inject the necessary funds in the bank. When the
bank is successful it will either accumulate reserves or repay its debt to the
(external) insurer. Note that this mechanism satisﬁes the Government or
the Deposit Insurance Company’s budget constraints so it is self-ﬁnancing
in expected terms.
2. The opposite case occurs when there is no safety net. In this case, only
internal insurance through building of reserves is available, and the ﬁrst
generations have to decrease their consumption in order to provide insur-
ance to the future ones. For example, this occurs if the ﬁrst realization is
a bad one. With some probability these reserves go back to zero after a
series of unlucky realizations of yt and the next generations will have to
decrease their consumption again.
Intertemporal smoothing is perfect in case one where all the risks of the
banking sector are borne by the Treasury. This perfect insurance of the banking
11sector by the Treasury may turn out to be infeasible or to involve too high a
cost. On the other hand, it is seldom the case that the Government provides
no safety net to the banking sector as occurs in case 2. So, we will focus on
the case of a limited safety net. Although we do not model it explicitely, notice
that this framework allows to determine the optimal size of the safety net by
comparing the beneﬁts of insurance and the costs of banks bail-outs. This
is done independently of any reference to managers excessive risk taking and
absence of market discipline. We hasten to remark that the presence of a safety
net, although self ﬁnancing in expected terms, requires the institution which
implements it to be able to violate its period-by-period budget constraint when
needed6.
Assume the safety net mechanism is deposit insurance. Then, limited insur-
ance implies that there is a maximum level of deposits the bank is able to raise,
dt ≤ d and in our model this is tantamount to imposing a minimum capital
requirement.
T h eb a n kw i l ls e ta tt i m et =0a dividend rule Dt. With some probability the
bank will go bankrupt and the deposit insurance company will inject additional
funds which it will recover in future periods. As it is obvious to regulators,
the probability a bank goes bankrupt depends on the dividend rule it states,
Dt. This will be important in the discussion as we will argue that the regulator
may set restrictions on dividend rules, as dividend distribution reduces the bank
capital.









c1t + dt + qt = et
c2t = dt(1 + rd)+qt+1 + Dt
Dt = ytxB − rddt + Mt − Mt+1 if positive
Dt =0otherwise
The solution to this program will be a function
Dt = φ(Mt,e t,y t)
2.5 Competition and the role of regulation
As we have already stated in Lemma 2, competition disables the ability of banks
to provide intertemporal insurance. Consequently, if the banking industry is
competitive, the existence of a safety net will allow to smooth the intertemporal
ﬂow of bank payments to their claimholders.
6This argument is reminiscent of the Fiscal Theory whereby monetary policy non-neutrality
is possible only if the Government budget constraint is violated.
12Banks will not be redundant because the safety net provides them with
access to a diﬀerent security. In this way the existence of a safety net allows the
reconciliation of competition with intertemporal smoothing. Notice that in order
for regulation to force banks to smooth their dividend stream, it is not enough to
provide a deposit insurance mechanism. Competition among banks would lead
to choose the maximum dividend and therefore banks will never build reserves,
thus leading to a high probability of bankruptcy. In order to deal with this
lack of incentives to create reserves, regulation will require the banks to make
loss provisions which is equivalent in our model to restricting the dividend rules
banks can choose. The same objective can be achieved by establishing minimum
capital requirements for banks, thus allowing them to build the necessary capital
buﬀer that limits the eﬀect of competition and facilitates dividend smoothing.
3A c c o u n t i n g s y s t e m
In the previous section we have focussed on the role of banks as providers of
intertemporal insurance and the key role of the dividend rule. We will now turn
to examine the role of the accounting system.
A ﬁrst remark is in order regarding the environments where accounting sys-
tems could be compared. If dividend rules are unrestricted, then accounting
rules are irrelevant. This is obvious as nothing prevents the bank manager
from ignoring its proﬁts and paying the optimal dividend Dt. More precisely,
if the bank’s dividends are not aﬀected by unrealized capital gains then there
is no point in comparing book value and fair value accounting since this is the
only diﬀerence between the two and dividend is the only channel in our simple
framework through which this diﬀerence may aﬀect consumption.
Therefore, we will assume both that unrealized capital gains aﬀect dividends
and that banks’ dividends depend on accounting proﬁt s . T h i ss e e m st ob ea
natural assumption, which lies at the heart of the debate of book vs. fair value
accounting which we will extensively use in our analysis. Nevertheless, keep in
mind that our result would obtain if the banks’ dividends were set as a function
of, for instance, the bank’s net income.
The dividend rule we consider, will therefore take the form
Dt = ϕ(πt) (6)
for an increasing function ϕ, where πt are the bank’s proﬁts. These proﬁts
will be diﬀerent under book and fair value.
Under book value accounting the proﬁts are πB
t = xB
t yt − rdd ,w h e r e a s




t (pt+1 − pt) . Thus, we have two dividend rules, Dt = ϕ(πi
t),i= B,F.
Notice that we do not restrict dividends to be distributed only when proﬁts
are positive.
133.1 Welfare comparison
From the perspective of allocative ex ante eﬃciency that we have adopted, the
question that arises is simply which of these rules allows for a better intertem-
poral smoothing.
Of course, this may depend on the distribution of prices. Yet, the theory
of eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets provide us with a natural property for the price
distribution, and that is that prices follow a martingale, satisfying, E( g pt+1 |
pt)=pt, because given current available information, today’s price is the best
predictor of tomorrow’s one. This assumption allow us to formulate the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: If the market price of the bank’s assets, pt, follows a mar-
tingale then book value accounting Pareto dominates fair value accounting.
Proof. Since E(pt+1)=pt,a n dpt+1 is independent of yt, πF
t is a mean
preserving spread of πB
t . The corresponding consumption patterns are c1t =
et−qt and ci
2t = qt+1 +Dt,i= B,F. Therefore, cF
2t is a mean preserving spread
of cB
2t a n dL e m m a3a p p l i e s .
The crucial insight of this proposition is that book value accounting facili-
tates intertemporal smoothing by allowing banks to smooth dividend distribu-
tion. On the other hand, fair value accounting, by accurately describing proﬁts
period by period precludes banks from transferring resources from the good
states to the bad ones. Loosely speaking, book value accounting applies a mul-
tiperiod budget constraint to banks, whereas fair value obliges banks to satisfy
period by period their budget constraint.
Notice that other price distributions may lead to the same result. In par-
ticular, when prices are i.i.d., since E(pt+1)=µ is independent of yt, πF
t is a
mean preserving spread of πB
t .
Remark that in the extreme case of an unlimited safety net, where the Trea-
sury bears all the risks, the ﬁrst best is attained and consumption is stationary
providing consumers with full insurance against business cycle risk, yt.
3.2 Expected bankruptcy cost comparison
It could be argued that the comparison between the two types of accounting
rules need to consider welfare comparisons only. Indeed, it is sometimes a clearly
stated mandate for the regulator, as in the case of the US, to minimize the
expected costs of bank bankruptcies. For this reason, we now turn to this
alternative perspective and focus on the regulators’ minimization of bankruptcy
costs. We study to what extent fair value accounting might reduce the expected
cost of bankruptcy. If this is the case, a cost minimizing regulator would favour
fair value accounting over book value accounting.
In order to analyse this point, we will assume the cost of bankruptcy is
increasing in the bank’s LGD (loss-given-default). LGD measures the extent of
a bank’s default at time t +1and equals the diﬀerence between liabilities and
14assets, that is:
L = Max(0,d t(1 + rd) − (Mt + xB
t (pt+1 + yt))
Note that this cost depends upon the price of the asset pt+1 but not on
the accounting rule that is chosen. Consequently, the cost of bankruptcy is
independent of the accounting system chosen since the actual default is measured
at current market values.
The diﬀerence in the expected cost of bankruptcy stems from the diﬀerent
probabilities of bankruptcy depending on which accounting system we employ
to characterize the onset of bankruptcy. This is the case as bankruptcy under
book value is deﬁned by the book value of assets being lower than the book
value of liabilities. That is,
Mt + xB
t (p0 + yt) <d t(1 + rd)
where p0 reﬂects the historical value of the assets7.
The fair value deﬁnition of bankruptcy is given instead by
Mt + xB
t (pt+1 + yt) <d t(1 + rd)
From these two inequalities we are able to compute the bankruptcy proba-
bilities for both book and fair value accounting.
The probability of bankruptcy at time t will be given by the value of equity,
which in the fair value case equals EF
t = Mt + xB(pt+1 + yt) − dt(1 + rd).L e t
Mτ = Mτ−1+xByτ−1−rddt−Dτ−1. By substituting recursively this expression,
taking into account M0 =0and E0 + dt = xB
t p0, it is easy to compute EF
t as
the result of the series of yt and of the policy dividend Dt. This yields
EF




t yτ − (Dτ + dtrd)+xB
t (pτ+1 − p0))
for the fair value case, which simply corresponds to the process of capital
accumulation over time.
On the other hand, for the book value case where capital gains are not taken






(Dt + dtrd)), and capital gains xB
t (pτ+1 − p0) are disregarded.
In order to compare these two expressions, we have to answer the question
of whether the dividend distribution policy diﬀers between fair and book value.
7It is possible to argue that even if we consider book value accounting, the market may
impose the closure of a bank when the market value of its assets becomes lower than the
market value of its liabilities, despite the fact that the bank is solvent from a book value
perspective. In this case, the accounting rule for bankruptcy coincides for the two accounting
schemes. This in turn implies that the expected cost of bankruptcy is the same for the two
accounting systems.
15Indeed, in the absence of any assumption on dividend policy it is impossible to
infer anything from the above expression. Fortunately, there is a quite natural




t ,y t) and DB
τ = ϕ(πB
t ,y t) with
dϕ
dπt ≥ 0
This is a natural assumption in the present context, because it assumes the
same behavior on behalf of the managers, except for the choice of book vs. fair
accounting system. Notice, that the extreme case where dividend distribution
does not depend upon the accounting system, where ϕ(πB
t ,y t)=φ(yt) is also
covered by our analysis.
Under the above assumption, if pt follows a martingale, then EF
t is a mean
preserving spread of EB
t . To see why, notice, ﬁrst that the dividend DF
τ is a
mean preserving spread of DB
τ for any τ. Second, the value of equity under fair
value accounting, EF
t , includes the random term xB
t (pτ+1 − p0).
This implies that the probability of bankruptcy is higher under fair value
accounting than under book value accounting.
Of course, the above conclusion has to be revised if, instead of following a
martingale, asset prices are i.i.d, as we assumed in section 2, so that E(pt)=γ.
In that case, we would observe mean reversion, and depending on the initial
price, we would have E(pτ+1 − p0)=γ − p0 either positive or negative. If
γ −p0 =0 , then our argument carries over and EF
t i sam e a np r e s e r v i n gs p r e a d
of EB
t . Nevertheless, when asset prices are initially low, (γ − p0 > 0) this term
decreases the probability of a bankruptcy under fair value accounting. This
is quite intuitive and directly related to our deﬁnition of bankruptcy: when
the bank has a high probability of obtaining capital gains in the future, its
probability of a bankruptcy is decreased if capital gains are part of its proﬁts
and accumulated to its capital. It is then unclear which of the two eﬀects, mean
preserving spread versus undervalued assets will prevail. Conversely, if initially
asset prices are high, so that γ − p0 is negative, the probability of bankruptcy
is larger under a fair value accounting system, as the two eﬀects go in the same
direction. Namely, not only is the distribution of EF
t ”more risky”, but it also
has a lower expected value.
The existence of two cases, low initial prices and high initial prices, sheds
light on the issue on the debate on reserves in the sixties, mentioned in the
introduction. If p0 is low (γ − p0 > 0) the bank has accumulated reserves
and this favours book value accounting; however, if (γ − p0 < 0) the bank has
negative reserves or non-disclosed losses, and this goes against the use of book
value accounting.
4 Fair value accounting, transparency and mar-
ket discipline
Since the debate on book vs. fair value accounting has emphasized the positive
role of fair value accounting in disciplining banks, we would like to discuss this
16issue more extensively here using the insights of our model as a background.
The market discipline enhances eﬃciency because it leads to the elimination
of the lame ducks. In the present context, this means that if under fair value
accounting a bank’s capital is below the minimum required by regulation, in-
vestors will not lend to the bank and this will forced it to close down. Notice
that market discipline could also have been implemented by the bank regulator
if the regulators deemed that the cost of forbearance was too high. Closing
down an insolvent bank is eﬃcient for several reasons. First, as for any ﬁrm, it
redistributes the bankrupt resources to the surviving banks. Second, it limits
the cost of bankruptcy, a point particularly sensitive for banks, as closing down
a bank when its capital is still positive is less costly than closing it down when it
is bankrupt. Third, as the bank closure is declared in the early stages, it limits
the possibility for the bank to “gamble for resurrection”8.
The conditions for market discipline to operate are those of imperfect infor-
mation, where investor would not be able to assess the real value of the bank
under book value but would be able to do so under fair value. Notice that we
could complement book value accounting with the disclosure of the banks fair
value of assets and liabilities. In this way, investors could enforce market dis-
cipline via their investment decisions. This would combine the virtues of book
value accounting as related to intertemporal smoothing with those of allowing
investor to discipline ineﬃcient bank strategies.
It should be noted that (imperfect) market discipline may generate a type
1 error by penalizing a bank that is aﬀected by a sudden liquidity undersupply
whereas book value accounting may lead to a type 2 error by not detecting
promptly an insolvent bank.
However, increased transparency and the subsequent market discipline in-
duced by investors behavior also aﬀects banks portfolio choice. Rational bank
managers who expect a temporary adverse shock may act in an overly conserva-
tive manner9. In particular, they may choose either not to invest in risky assets
or to reduce deposit interest rates, or opt not to distribute dividends. Thus
ill-fortune and not managerial mismanagement may lead to portfolio choices
that provide no intertemporal smoothing whatsoever, and consequently result
in equilibrium allocations that are ex ante ineﬃcient. The upshot of the argu-
ment is that fair value accounting via increased transparency and the consequent
market discipline induced by risk-averse investors (or through regulatory inter-
vention) reveals the classic trade-oﬀ between intra and intertemporal eﬃciency.
Fair value accounting increases market discipline and this increases intratempo-
ral eﬃciency. Yet, at the same time fair value accounting reduces intertemporal
8These two aspects were perfectly illustrated in the US S&L crisis in the 1980s. A large
fraction of the cost of the crisis was due to forbearance. Nevertheless, another fraction of the
cost was due to the investment in high risk real state development projects outside the area
of competence of the banks. This we interpret as “gambling for resurrection”.
9Implicit to this argument is the assumption of incompleteness regarding executive com-
pensation contrats. If the optimal compensation scheme is not available, then managers would
not invest in their shareholders best interest. The eﬀect of book vs. fair value accounting on
managers compensation is a relevant but complex issue that has not been addressed so far in
t h el i t e r a t u r ea n di sb e y o n dt h es c o p eo fo u rp a p e r .
17eﬃciency by limiting intertemporal smoothing.
So, to summarize, the introduction of the positive eﬀects of market discipline
lead us to a trade-oﬀ between intertemporal smoothing and the eﬃciency of the
banking closure that could be attained through market discipline. Fair value
accounting and the resulting market discipline increases the intratemporal eﬃ-
ciency of the banking system while book value accounting leads to intertempo-
ral eﬃciency. Finally, given incomplete markets and the fact that equilibria are
“typically” constrained ineﬃcient (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)),
increased risk taking with its ensuing LGD may improve welfare. On the one
hand, banks improve intertemporal smoothing, thus economic eﬃciency, but on
the other hand, may generate a deadweight loss due to banks failure.
5 Concluding remarks and extensions
Our analysis points to the direction of concrete policy implications. First, banks
act as intergenerational connectors generating ex ante welfare improvements via
intertemporal smoothing. No agent or an institution that is ﬁnitely lived can
substitute this banking activity. For example, neither ﬁnancial markets nor mu-
tual funds can implement equilibrium allocations resulting from intertemporal
smoothing. However, the implementation of banks as intergenerational connec-
tors requires regulatory intervention. Some form of safety net such as deposit
insurance is necessary when the banking sector faces repeated adverse shocks.
Absence any type of safety net, any attempt by banks to smooth intertempo-
ral consumption would result in a higher volatility of banks equity prices, thus
leaving the equilibrium allocation unchanged, as it happens in a ﬁnite horizon
environment.
Second, within the class of linear proﬁt dependent dividend rules, book value
accounting dominates fair value accounting in ﬁnancial reporting. This is the
case because book value accounting allows for better intertemporal smoothing
than fair value. The reason behind this diﬀerence lies in the fact that book
value accounting is a mean preserving ‘shrink’ over fair value accounting, and
therefore, it enables the banking sector via dividends to smoothen intertemporal
consumption of its shareholders.
From a regulatory point of view, book value accounting minimizes expected
costs of bankruptcy industry. This is the case either when asset prices follow
a martingale or when they are falling relative to their initial values. The key
intuition behind this result is that both the probability of bankruptcy increases
when asset prices fall and also fair value accounting is mean preserving spread
of book value accounting thus reducing the expected value of equity. Both of
these eﬀects reinforce each other and they result into higher bankruptcy costs
under fair value accounting.
Finally, the case in favour of the cited view that fair value accounting alone
improves the eﬃciency of the banking industry by increasing transparency may
be overstated. In our framework it is not always true that increased trans-
parency allows market discipline to improve eﬃciency by reducing the riskiness
18of an insolvent bank’s portfolio. Indeed, market discipline may very well in-
troduce artiﬁcial volatility into earnings reports, and thereby preclude smooth
dividend rules that provide investors with ex ante eﬃcient intertemporal insur-
ance.
Our framework provides a foundation for analyzing dynamic ﬁnancial inter-
mediation. However, certain characteristics of banking that are absent at this
stage can easily be incorporated into it. The issue of moral hazard is abstracted
away since we assume no split between ownership and control of banks. The rich
literature of moral hazard in banking (see Freixas and Rochet (1997)) can be
readily embedded into the model. Second, in order to address more succinctly
transparency and market discipline with respect to associated accounting rules,
one needs to formally introduce active and heterogeneous banks. This can be
achieved using the model of Tsomocos (2003) which is compatible with the
present one. Finally, one needs to examine a wider class of dividend rules than
the ones we have considered here and investigate their welfare properties.
We view this paper as a ﬁrst step towards modelling dynamic ﬁnancial in-
termediation. Incorporating into our framework the aforementioned extensions
would allow us to address rigorously the trade oﬀ between systemic risk and the
possibility of contagion vs. the eﬃciency gains due to intertemporal smoothing
that book value ﬁnancial reporting possesses.
6 Mathematical Appendix.
Proof. Proof. of Lemma 1:
Assume there is a ﬁnite period T. Then, the bank is redundant because the
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies and prices will adjust so as to reﬂect the value
of the assets the bank holds.
Assume the bank holds MT−1 in cash and xB of the stock. At time T the
banks assets are MT = MT−1 + ytxB in cash and its holding of the stock are
unchanged. Since the value of the bank is distributed among its equity holder,
its value will be qT +DT = MT−1 +(pT +yT)xB and return on the bank stock




qT−1 . This implies that a portfolio of
(MT−1,x B) will generate exactly the same contingent return and the price of
the bank has to equal the price of the portfolio: qT−1 = MT−1 + pT−1xB
Proceeding by backwards induction, assume that the equality qt = Mt+ptxB
holds for t and let us proceed to prove that it has to hold for t−1. The proof is
t h es a m ea sa b o v e ,w i t ht h ed i ﬀerence that the distributed dividend may now
diﬀer from the ytxB. The diﬀerence ytxB − Dt will be added (subtracted) to
the bank cash holding, so that Mt = Mt−1 + ytxB − Dt. But once we compute






qt−1 so that the value of the bank equals the value of a portfolio
with a holding of Mt−1 of cash and xB of shares.
.
197 References
Aghion, P., Bolton, P. and S. Fries (1999), “Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts:
The Case of Transition Economies”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics 155, 51-70.
Allen F. and D. Gale (1997), “Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and In-
tertemporal Smoothing”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105, n. 3:523-46.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1997), “Core Principles for Ef-
fective Banking Supervision”. Basel, September.
Bhattacharya, S., Fulghieri, P. and R. Rovelli (1998), “Financial Interme-
diation Versus Stock Markets in a Dynamic Intertemporal Model”, Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 154:291-324.
Bloise, G. and H.M. Polemarchakis (2004) “Intertemporal Optimality”, mimeo,
Brown University.
Chisnall, P. (2000), “Fair Value Accounting: an industry view”, British
Bankers’ Association, 2000.
Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983), “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, 91:401-419.
Enria et al. (2004), “Fair Value Accounting and Financial Stability”, ECB
Occasional Paper, 13, April 2004.
Freixas and Rochet (1987) ”Microeconomics of Banking”. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachussets.
Geanakoplos, J.D. and H.M. Polemarchakis (1986) “Existence, Regularity
and Constrained Suboptimality of Competitive Allocations When the Asset
Market is Incomplete”, in: Heller, W., St a r r e t ,D .( E d s ) ,E s s a y si nH o n o ro fK .
Arrow, Vol. III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
Goodhart, C.A.E., (1972) “The Business of Banking: 1891-1914”, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Gorton, G. and G. Pennacchi (1990), “Financial Intermediaries and Liquid-
ity Creation”, Journal of Finance 45, No. 1, March 1990.
Jackson, P. and D. Lodge, (2000), “Fair value accounting, capital standards,
expected loss provisioning, and ﬁnancial stability”, Financial Stability Review,
Bank of England.
Qi, Jianping (1994) ”Bank Liquidity and Stability in an Overlapping Gen-
erations Model”, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 7, n. 2, pp. 389-417.
Samuelson, P.A., (1958) “An Exact Consumption-loan Model of Interest
Without the Social Contrivance of Money”, Journal of Political Economy, 66:467-
82.
The Economist (1901), p. 204
Tsomocos (2003), “Equilibrium Analysis, Banking an Financial Instability”,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 39:619:655.
20